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Many datasets feature seemingly disparate entries that actually
refer to the same entity. Reconciling these entries, or “matching,” is
challenging, especially in situations where there are errors in the
data. In certain contexts, the situation is even more complicated: an
active adversary may have a vested interest in having the matching
process fail. By leveraging eight years of data, we investigate one
such adversarial context: matching different online anonymous
marketplace vendor handles to unique sellers. Using a combination
of random forest classifiers and hierarchical clustering on a set of
features that would be hard for an adversary to forge or mimic,
we manage to obtain reasonable performance (over 75% precision
and recall on labels generated using heuristics), despite generally
lacking any ground truth for training. Our algorithm performs
particularly well for the top 30% of accounts by sales volume, and
hints that 22,163 accounts with at least one confirmed sale map to
15,652 distinct sellers—of which 12,155 operate only one account,
and the remainder between 2 and 11 different accounts. Case study
analysis further confirms that our algorithm manages to identify
non-trivial matches, as well as impersonation attempts.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Many datasets feature seemingly disparate entries that actually
refer to the same real-world entity. For instance, in a demographic
census, a unique individual may appear under several entries (“John
Public,” “John Q. Public,” etc.) that have to be reconciled prior to
analysis to ensure the quality of the census data. This reconciliation
process is typically termed matching, and has been extensively
studied in statistics, commonly under the name record linkage [6].
Other matching instances include reconciling disparate casualty
reports during disasters or wars, linking census records to other
demographic surveys, disambiguating inventors, authors, or movies
in patent, bibliographic, or movie databases.
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Matching is challenging due to error—including approximations
during data collection. Fields between different datasets may be
different, and entries may be missing fields. Many matching algo-
rithms tackle these problems, but most do not consider that the
presence of separate entries in the original data may be due to
malice. In some contexts, however, adversaries have a vested inter-
est in seeing the matching process fail, either by finding spurious
matches, or by failing to match entries that refer to the same entity.
An example of such an adversarial matching context is the online
anonymous marketplace (“dark net market”) ecosystem [5, 7, 11, 14,
18, 22, 25, 30, 34]. Different from traditional electronic commerce
marketplaces such as AmazonMarketplace, eBay, or AliBaba, online
anonymous marketplaces strive to offer anonymity guarantees to
both buyers and sellers, by relying on network anonymizers (e.g.,
Tor [10]), and, increasingly, on privacy-minded cryptocurrencies
such as Monero [21]. Regrettably, a significant fraction of online
anonymous marketplace transactions involve illicit goods [25].
In such an anonymous setting, vendors who operate different
accounts may not want these different accounts to be matched. For
instance, a given vendor may compartmentalize different lines of
businesses between different accounts to increase their operational
security [27]. Conversely, some vendors may attempt to imperson-
ate well-known accounts—e.g., by registering the same handle on a
different marketplace—to defraud unsuspecting customers.
Coming up with proper matching techniques is important for
researchers, law enforcement, and patrons of these marketplaces.
Researchers studying these ecosystems might be interested in get-
ting an accurate idea of the number of sellers involved. Any analysis
related to seller behavior is more suitably done on a seller-level
than an account-level, for example seller longevity and reputation.
Law enforcement have an interest in linking online identities to
real-world identities, and information from different accounts can
be combined to provide leads.1 In the absence of an automated
matching technique, there have been reports of law enforcement
using online forums or manual comparisons of items sold [29], as
well as the Grams search engine [3, 28].
Our problem shares some similarities with the general issue of
Sybil detection in distributed systems [12]. Sybils are accounts that
are all controlled by the same person or group to gain an advantage;
for instance, to manipulate reputation in online reviewing systems
or promote social networking accounts [32]. The key difference,
though, is that Sybil operators generally need to control many ac-
counts to achieve their objectives and as a result, Sybil detection
can benefit from observing common patterns among Sybils. By
contrast, we deal with fewer accounts which are truly operated by
humans, and thus emit less regularity in their observable patterns.
1For example, in perhaps the most well-known marketplace-related arrest, the creator
of Silk Road was known by a pseudonym, Dread Pirate Roberts. Authorities linked
this to another account on a message board, Frosty, and Frosty’s real-world identity
was known to be Ross Ulbricht, contributing to his eventual arrest [23].
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Furthermore, Sybil detection algorithms usually do not try to ad-
dress the dual issue of impersonation attacks. In this respect, our
work is more closely related to detection of “sockpuppet” accounts
(a user account controlled by an individual who controls at least
one other user account) in online discussion forums [17].
There have been a few previous attempts to match vendor ac-
counts in online anonymous marketplaces. Two took the simple
approach of matching (PGP) cryptographic public keys advertised
by different accounts [5, 25] which cannot handle impersonation
attacks, since anybody can copy somebody else’s public key. At the
other end of the complexity spectrum, the Grams search engine [3]
was an elaborate and largely manual and crowdsourced attempt to
match accounts across marketplaces. Grams was taken offline in
December 2017, reportedly due to the high human cost of operating
such a database [2]. Furthermore, crowdsourcing is vulnerable to
poisoning, in which an adversary injects malicious content.
In this paper, we describe an automated classifier that matches
disparate vendor accounts and detects impersonators, relying on
features that are cumbersome for an adversary to forge.We evaluate
on eight years (2011–2018) of online anonymous marketplace data,
and find that 22,163 accounts with at least one confirmed sale map
to 15,652 distinct sellers. 12,155 sellers (77%) operate only one ac-
count, while the remainder operates between 2 (1,909 sellers) and 11
accounts (2 sellers). Because ground truth in this context is elusive,
we compare the performance of our algorithm with data obtained
from Grams and from PGP key matching—although these labels
are problematic, they give a general sense of model performance.
Using these labels, our algorithm achieves more than 75% precision
and recall. It works particularly well for vendor accounts with sig-
nificant sales volume (approximately 90% recall at 75% precision
for the top 30% of accounts). We present a few case studies where
ground truth is documented through criminal complaints or forum
discussions; we can automatically discover reported impersonation
attempts and non-trivial links between accounts. We also discuss
scalability limitations of our matching algorithm. Our hope is to
pave the way for additional research in the context of adversarial
matching, while giving the research community access to our data.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
We focus our literature review on three complementary areas: sta-
tistics research on matching problems, Sybil detection in social
networks and distributed systems, and online anonymous market-
place measurements.
Matching. Matching in computer science and statistics refers to
the disambiguation of records in the absence of a unique or common
identifier. Probabilistic methods estimate, for each pair of records,
a match probability based on available features. If the probability
of match exceeds some cutoff, the pair is identified to be a match.
Fellegi and Sunter’s 1969 probabilistic framework [13] is often con-
sidered the standard model for unsupervised record linkage [35].
When labels are available, the matching problem can also be seen as
a supervised classification task, and more recently, machine learn-
ing methods have gained popularity (see, e.g., [31]). In the literature,
records often refer to single entries in demographic, bibliographic,
and other databases [6]. By contrast, we treat records as an entire
account profile, consisting of a history of user pages, inventories
and sales. Further, our application to dark net marketplaces has a
unique adversarial component, that to our knowledge has not been
studied in detail in the matching literature.
Sybil and impersonator detection. Douceur [12] formalized the
Sybil attack in the context of peer-to-peer networks. Sybil attacks
frequently operate at scale, which requires a degree of automation.
Subsequent work proposed defenses against Sybil attacks in social
networks [33] and online reviewing systems [32] by exploiting
regularity in certain patterns (e.g., social network account creation
date, number and type of followers) that automated Sybil creation
produce in order to distinguish between Sybils and human-operated
accounts. Our matching problem is different: the accounts we need
to match are all curated and operated by humans. We also have
to address impersonation attacks, in which an individual creates
an account with the fraudulent goal of impersonating a different
vendor. Impersonation attacks have, for instance, been studied in
the context of DNS typosquatting [1, 16, 20, 26]. Carried out at scale,
these attacks can be detected by analyzing relatively simple features,
whereas we have to consider more targeted, smaller-scale attempts.
As mentioned in the introduction, our work more closely resembles
Kumar et al.’s [17] work on “sockpuppets” in online discussion
communities. The context they analyze, however, calls for markedly
different features, e.g., writing style and community interactions
such as responses to posts. Their focus is also on characterizing
behavior as opposed to the actual matching task.
Online anonymous marketplaces. Researchers have tried tomodel
the economics of online anonymous marketplaces (“dark net mar-
kets”). This began with descriptive statistics of the Silk Roadmarket-
place [7], later expanding to include characterizations of the whole
ecosystem and its longitudinal evolution [25], as well as analyses
of specific categories of goods [14, 30]. These papers mostly focus
on macro-level considerations—e.g., calculating the total revenue
of a given marketplace or of a given line of business over time—
which do not require disambiguation between vendor accounts. A
smaller number of papers have attempted to characterize online
anonymous marketplaces at a finer, transaction-level granularity,
for instance to evidence geographic properties of the trade [11, 22].
These studies do not attempt to link vendor accounts.
Closer to our own efforts, Broséus et al. [5] analyzes vendor activ-
ity across eight different marketplaces. Like Soska and Christin [25],
Broséus et al. rely on PGP keys for account matching, which, as
we discussed in the introduction, is an imperfect proxy. Wang et al.
[34] attempt to perform account linkage by analyzing item images.
While a promising direction, image features could be changed at
relatively low cost for an attacker, or normalized by a marketplace
operator prior to publication. Finally, recent work in cryptocur-
rency tracing tries to link different financial accounts owned by
the same entities by examining the underlying cryptocurrency
ledgers [15, 19, 21]. We complement these approaches by matching
vendor accounts solely using publicly available marketplace data.
3 DARK NET MARKET DATASET
We combine data collected by Soska and Christin [25] (including
data from the original 2013 Silk Road study [7]), with data collected
for the AlphaBay marketplace [21, 30], and finally with data more
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Market # snap. Collection # accts # accts # keys
interval w/ sale w/ key
Silk Road 1 164 2011-22-11 to 2013-08-18 2,327 467 574
BMR 25 2013-10-11 to 2013-11-29 975 0 0
Silk Road 2 195 2013-11-24 to 2014-10/26 1,196 1,359 1,926
Pandora 140 2013-12-01 to 2014-10-28 457 0 0
Agora 161 2013-12-28 to 2015-06-12 1,956 2,563 3,246
Hydra 29 2014-07-01 to 2014-10-28 132 10 11
Evolution 45 2014-07-02 to 2015-02-16 2,338 11,586 12,288
AlphaBay 27 2015-03-18 to 2017-05-24 6,215 8,370 9,865
Dream 19 2017-07-15 to 2018-08-20 4,305 3,950 4,281
Valhalla 3 2017-07-28 to 2017-12-06 268 332 341
Traderoute 5 2017-07-28 to 2017-10-11 1,768 2,463 2,592
Berlusconi 8 2017-11-22 to 2018-08-22 226 0 0
Other 175 2013-10-19 to 2014-08-11 N/A 999 1,160
Total 996 2011-22-11 to 2018-08-22 22,163 32,101 36,284
Table 1: Markets collected and analyzed.Markets are chrono-
logically ordered.
recently collected from the Dream, Berlusconi, Valhalla, and Trader-
oute marketplaces. We obtained these data by repeated scraping
and parsing of all web pages present in these marketplaces. We
refer the reader to our previous work [7, 25], for a discussion of the
technical and ethical details of data collection.
Most marketplaces consist of a collection of publicly-accessible
vendor profile and item pages. Vendor pages contain a description of
the vendor, including their various offerings, and, quite frequently,
a cryptographic (PGP) public key which can be used by buyers to
encrypt and authenticate communications with the vendor.
Item pages describe a given product, its associated price, and
feedback left by buyers about their purchases of the item. As prior
work [25] has shown, these items can generally be characterized
into just a few high level categories. Feedback is often, but not
always, mandatory, and is a reasonable proxy for sales [7, 25].
3.1 Data corpus overview
Table 1 describes, for each marketplace we consider, the number of
snapshots taken, the data collection interval, the number of ven-
dor accounts, and the number of distinct PGP keys present on the
marketplace. PGP keys extraction is imperfect, as evidenced by
the absence of keys extracted from Berlusconi, BMR, and Pandora.
“Other” corresponds to smaller markets (Flo, Utopia, The Market-
place, Tor Bazaar) or markets for which our data is very sparse
(Sheep). These are only used to cull additional PGP keys. Evolution
data also contains several non-vendor accounts.
For analyzing PGP keys and labeling data we consider the entire
dataset of 178,270 accounts. However for training and evaluating
our model (Sections 5 and 6) we only consider vendor accounts
with at least one publicly reported sale (i.e., at least one piece of
feedback). This for instance means that we discard 3,613 zero-sale
accounts from AlphaBay.
3.2 Account-level information
For each vendor account, we extract information, such as their ID,
sales category and diversity, profile data, item title and descriptions,
and feedback received. We include characteristics that are difficult
for an adversary to control, such as item prices and days in which
sales were made.
We also extract per-account inventories of items that had at least
one sale throughout the period. For each item, we extract the pre-
dicted category [25], the dosage (number and unit, e.g. “8 grams”),
and the quantity e.g., number of pills, tabs, tablets, blotters, etc. To
infer dosages and quantities, we use regular expressions [8].
Finally, we extracted 28,417 PGP keys from the profiles and item
listings of 32,101 distinct accounts. Because some vendors use the
same key on multiple accounts on different marketplaces, there are
significantly more accounts with a PGP key than unique PGP keys.
For most modern marketplaces, the number of accounts with a PGP
key is similar to those with a sale. Evolution is an exception: the
data contains non-vendor (buyers or simply curious individuals)
accounts that may contain PGP keys.
3.3 Grams data
Grams, the “dark web search engine [3]” was an attempt at linking
and supplementing different vendor profiles on various market-
places. The procedure by which vendor profiles were linked was
never clear, but clues point to extensive manual curation. When
Grams shut down in December 2017, its purported administrators
released their vendor databases to the public [2]. We use these
databases as an additional source of information.
Grams reports knowledge of about 38,416 handles mapping to
27,491 unique vendors, over 15 marketplaces, and associated with
22,357 unique PGP keys. Five of the marketplaces Grams includes
overlap with ours: Agora, AlphaBay, Evolution, Valhalla, Dream.
The data correspond to 28,727 handles, grouped into 19,021 unique
vendors which collectively published over 19,957 PGP keys. The
Grams database contains an impostor field to denote imperson-
ation attacks. This field is set on 129 handles, including 102 handles
for the marketplaces of interest to us.
3.4 Discussion
As can be expected from such a longitudinal collection effort, our
data is incomplete. For instance, no PGP public key was extracted
from our Berlusconi snapshots, despite evidence that as many as 52
different keys were present on the site at the time(s) we scraped it.
However, for our purposes, completeness of the data corpus is less
important than correctness. In fact, to be practical, our matching
algorithms should work with incomplete datasets.
4 DATA LABELING
By definition, we do not generally have any ground truth informa-
tion on matches between handles.2 Instead, we create three sets of
labels from heuristics, based on our existing data. We then discuss
properties of the labeled sets.
4.1 Labeling heuristics
The first two labeled sets are derived from PGP key information and
the third from Grams data. None of these techniques are perfect,
but these labeled sets are be useful for training and comparison
with our own classifier, which we describe in Section 5.
2In a handful of cases, as we will see in Section 6, ground truth is available from arrest
records—but those are only available in a very small fraction of all accounts, and may
not be complete even for these accounts.
KDD ’19, August 4–8, 2019, Anchorage, AK, USA Tai et al.
4.1.1 Common PGP keys. A common technique is to link handles
that purport to use the same PGP key [5, 25]. As mentioned briefly
in Section 1, this technique does not preclude incorrect links. First,
an impersonator can simply cut and paste a public key onto their
vendor page. While decrypting or signing a message requires the
associated private key, users cannot perform this verification non-
interactively. Likewise, two handles using different public keys
could belong to the same vendor: people frequently lose access to
their private PGP key, and thus have legitimate reasons to generate
new PGP keypairs. With these caveats in mind, for this first set of
labels, we use the following definition.
Definition 4.1. For any two vendor handles i and j, with asso-
ciated sets of public PGP keys Ki and Kj , we consider i and j as
mapping to the same vendor if and only if ∃k ∈ Ki ,∃k ′ ∈ Kj such
that k = k ′.
The relation defined in 4.1 fails to capture instances where a
vendor may have three or more accounts that do not all use the
same PGP key but may be linked through an intermediate key. To
address this case, we also consider the transitive closure of the
relation defined by 4.1.
4.1.2 Signature rings. PGP keys are associated with “user ids,”
which typically take the form of an email address. PGP offers the
ability for a user to sign other users’ public keys with their private
key. This signature operation is an endorsement that the signed
key is valid, and matches the user id it purports to belong to. In
other words, if userA signs user B’s key,A asserts that B’s key does
indeed belong to B. We thus use the following definition for our
second set of labels.
Definition 4.2. For any two vendor handles i and j, with associ-
ated sets of public PGP keys Ki and Kj , we consider i and j map to
the same vendor if and only if ∃k ∈ Ki ,∃k ′ ∈ Kj such that 1) the
private key Rk associated with k signs k ′, and 2) the email addresses
associated to k and k ′, e(k) and e(k ′), match (i.e., e(k) = e(k ′)).
Definition 4.2 should theoretically encompass Definition 4.1 as
users are expected to always sign their own key; we were surprised
to discover that most users in this corpus actually do not do this.
4.1.3 Grams data. The third set of labels we consider comes from
Grams. For each handle i , the Grams database contains a link
identifier. Different handles sharing the same link reportedly belong
to the same vendor. Formally,
Definition 4.3. For any two vendor handles i and j, we consider
i and j map to the same vendor if and only if link(i) = link(j).
Definition 4.3 should also encompass Definition 4.1 as PGPmatch-
ing seems to have been one of the criteria Grams used to match
users. In practice, though, the sources of data do not necessarily
overlap—we have data frommarketplaces that Grams does not cover
and vice-versa—so we expect certain differences. While Grams intu-
itively should provide a superior way of labeling handles, compared
to PGP linkage, the data Grams provide are limited to pre-2018
records only, miss a number of marketplaces we are considering,
and also struggle with small vendors that only have a few sales.
We also experimented with other possible labeling techniques,
such as inferring matches from vendor self-descriptions—but this
Figure 1: Classifier overview. This diagram shows the relation-
ship between our classifier, and the datasets described in Section 4.
Blue boxes denote input data; green boxes, outputs; and salmon






























is infeasible using simple heuristics, and more complex analysis is
subsummed by the features we eventually considered.
4.2 Labeled set properties
The relation of Definition 4.1 finds 13,099 pairwise relations on
11,711 out of the 32,101 vendor accounts that posted a key in Table 1.
The transitive closure of this relation yields another 855 pairs.
Despite 3,168 vendors using multiple PGP keys on the same
profile, and several more vendors using multiple keys across dif-
ferent profiles, we only observed three instances of the forward
signing described in Definition 4.2. One instance was from a PGP
key posted on two different accounts on The Marketplace, where
one was clearly marked as a test account. Another was from a ven-
dor by the same handle on the Dream, AlphaBay and Traderoute
markets, and the last was from keys sourced from the same handle
on AlphaBay. So, while in principle, PGP key signing is a powerful
technique for asserting the authenticity of a user-key relationship,
in practice, vendors do not seem to adopt it at all. This further
motivates linking techniques which do not rely on keys.
The addition of the Grams data (Definition 4.3) yielded an addi-
tional 18,215 pairwise relations beyond Definition 4.1. This is not
surprising since the Grams data is manually curated and identifies
instances where vendors either do not use PGP, or have elected to
create new keys for their different profiles.
5 CLASSIFIER DESIGN
Figure 1 presents an overview of our system. As mentioned, we first
restrict our data to accounts that reported at least one sale, that is,
accounts that have obtained at least one piece of feedback on one
of the item listings they offer. Out of the original 178,270 accounts
we originally identified, this corresponds to 22,163 accounts (see
Section 3). The labeled sets on the left side of the diagram represent
the labeling operations discussed in Section 4. Labeled set 1 corre-
sponds to Definition 4.1, Labeled set 2 corresponds to Definition 4.2,
and Labeled set 3 is the combination (union) of Definition 4.1, and
Definition 4.3, including transitive closures. The right side of the
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diagram describes our classifier system. We extract a number of
features from vendor account data and pass them to a random forest
classifier. The random forest classifier outputs pairwise distances
between accounts. Our classifier might produce matches that are
intransitive, which we resolve with hierarchical clustering. We next
turn to the discussion of our feature set, and our clustering choices.
5.1 Feature extraction
Our set of classifier features must fulfill three objectives. They must
be derivable from publicly-available data; they must (as a set) prop-
erly discriminate betweenmatches and non-matches; and theymust
(as a set) be resilient to evasion or poisoning. That is, an adversary
should not be able to easily produce misleading feature sets or copy
feature sets from a different vendor. For instance, an account handle
is easy to impersonate. If a famous vendor has not yet opened an
account on a brand new marketplace, an impersonator could easily
create an account with the famous vendor’s handle. On the other
hand, it is difficult for an adversary to convincingly mimic the sales
volume of an established vendor.
We generate pairwise comparisons for the 22,163 accounts, result-
ing in approximately 245 million pairs. For each pair, from account-
level information (see Section 3.2), we compute the following simi-
larity measures: Edit distance between the IDs; Same or different
marketplace; Jaccard similarity (J (A,B) = |A ∩ B |/|A ∪ B | for setsA
and B) between bag-of-words representation of profile descriptions,
item titles and descriptions (excluding any extracted PGP keys);
Inventory-related Jaccard similarities: consider unique categories
of all items sold, (category, dosage) pairs, (category, unit) pairs, and
(category, dosage, unit) tuples; Absolute difference between diver-
sity coefficients; Absolute difference between number of tokens in
the bag-of-words representations of profiles and item descriptions;
Absolute difference between number of days active (defined as the
period between which sales are recorded); Absolute difference be-
tween number of listings with feedback, number of feedback, and
number of feedback normalized by days active and marketplace
total; Absolute difference between five-number summary of sales
prices; Hamming distance (dH (x ,y) = 1n
∑n
i=1 I (xi , yi ), where x
and y are length n vectors) between binary vectors encoding days
in which sales occur; Fraction of overlapping sales days (number of
days where both accounts have sales / size of union of sales days);
Sum of number of sales days for both accounts.
The measures we selected should, as a whole, be costly for an
adversary to forge. Because we only consider items which received
feedback, an impersonator would not only have to post similar
items, but receive sales on these items, or have the ability to generate
fraudulent feedback to pretend sales occurred.While the latter is not
difficult to do, it is also usually noticed quite quickly by marketplace
operators and customers, and offenders are rapidly banned. Most
of the other features are directly related to sales as well.
5.2 Training and classification
Weuse a subset3 of Labeled set 1 in Figure 1, followingDefinition 4.1,
to train our classifier. This labeled set contains 3,653 matches (ones:
3Two authors of this paper extracted PGP keys independently, producing near-identical
results. For training, we ended up using a subset of the keys from data earlier in the
collection period (these contained 3,653 PGP matches, while the full Labeled set 1 has
7,564 matches). Even with this restricted set of labels, when we evaluate using the full
the pair of accounts shares at least one PGP key), 73,449,607 non-
matches (zeros; the pair of accounts does not share any PGP key),
and 172,134,943 pairs have missing labels (at least one of the two
accounts considered is not associated with any PGP key). Crucially,
we do not take these labels as ground truth, since, as discussed
in Section 4, they could be vulnerable to impersonation attacks.
Instead, for the training set, as an additional step we split this into
10 folds and obtain predictions by training on 9 folds and predicting
on the tenth (in the same way that cross-validation is typically
done). In this manner, if a training example was a pair consisting of
an impersonator copying another vendor’s PGP key and that said
vendor, the training label would be “match,” but it could still have a
low model prediction.
We then treat our classification task as a supervised learning
problem. We use a random forest classifier based on the extracted
features and the labels, and produce a set of pairwise distances.
More precisely, the output of the random forest classifier, for any
pair of accounts (i, j) is a proportion of votes pi j for the accounts
correspond to the same vendor, where pi j = Number of trees vot-
ing for match label / Total number of trees in random forest. We
compute the “distance” (or dissimilarity) di j between both accounts
as di j = 1 − pi j .
5.3 Hierarchical clustering
Because pairs are evaluated independently, our classifier might
produce matches that are intransitive. To resolve this, we use hier-
archical agglomerative clustering. Given accounts 1, . . . ,n, dissimi-
larities di j between each pair i and j , and dissimilarities d(G,H ) be-
tween groups of accountsG = {i1, i2, . . . ir } andH = {i1, i2, . . . , is },
the algorithm starts with each node in a single group, and repeatedly
merges groups such that d(G,H ) is within a threshold D.
We consider four different linkage methods to define d(G,H ).
Single linkage specifies that dsingle(G,H ) = mini ∈G, j ∈H di j . Infor-
mally, each account needs to be matched with only one other
account in the cluster, and missing links are filled in. Complete
linkage uses dcomplete(G,H ) = maxi ∈G, j ∈H di j . That is, every ac-
count in the cluster needs to match with all other accounts in
the cluster, and links are cut if this property is not satisfied. Av-
erage linkage [24] relies on daverage(G,H ) = 1|G | |H |
∑
i ∈G, j ∈H di j ,
which has no intuitive interpretation. Finally, minimax linkage
[4] uses dminimax(G,H ) = mini ∈G∪H r (i,G ∪ H ), where r (i,G) =
maxj ∈G di j , the radius of a group of nodesG around i . Informally,
each account i belongs to a cluster whose center c satisfies dic ≤ D;
that is, all accounts in the cluster need to match to the cluster center.
6 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
First, we evaluate performance with respect to various modeling
choices. Even though the labels we have defined in Section 4 do not
represent ground truth, we believe they are adequate enough to
illuminate the effects of various parameter choices. We then apply
our classifier to a series of case studies, to see how it performs in
practice.
set of PGP keys and Grams labels, including transitive closures, results are reasonable,
as we see in Figure 3.
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6.1 Classifier accuracy
We first evaluate the random forest classifier. This is done at a pair-
wise level, predicting whether each pair belongs to the same seller.
Because of the large class imbalance (most account pairs do not
match), we avoid measures that use the number of true negatives.
Instead of using traditional receiver operating characteristic (ROC)
curves, we graph precision (True Positive/Predicted Positive) ver-
sus recall (True Positive/Actual Positive).
Using the training data (described in Section 5), we train the
model sampling all of the labeled matches, and between 3,653 to
10 million labeled non-matches. We then predict on all remaining
non-sampled pairs. We additionally split the sampled pairs into 10
folds and obtain predictions on these by training on 9 folds and
predicting on the tenth. We evaluate performance first with respect
to the labeled set. As detailed in Section 5, this consists of 73,453,260
pairs (3,653 labeled matches), coming from the 12,121 accounts that
posted at least one PGP key. The remaining pairs are discarded
in this evaluation. In addition, we compared model performance
against a baseline of classifying pairs solely using a threshold-based
approach on edit distances of the IDs.
Figure 2 summarizes the results for three types of experiments.
Figure 2(a) shows that a classifier sampling at least 30,000 non-
matches strictly outperforms the baseline of ID distance. Also, try-
ing to increase recall past 80-85% decreases precision dramatically.
In other words, trying to correctly predict all actual matches results
in true non-matches overwhelmingly being predicted to be matches.
This means that the last 15% or so of actual matches may be difficult
to predict. These pairs of accounts behave very differently from
each other, yet share a common PGP key. There could be several
reasons for this. One possibility is that a seller opens an account on
a different marketplace to reserve the handle, and does not end up
using this account much. We observe this anecdotally, and investi-
gate this further in Figures 2(b) and 2(c). Figure 2(b) only plots pairs
where both accounts are in the top 30% of sales volumes, eliminat-
ing dormant accounts as described—this corresponds to accounts
exceeding roughly $11,000 in sales. Figure 2(c) weights each pair by
the smaller of the sales volumes in the pair, hence down-weighting
pairs involving dormant accounts. Both these plots show marked
improvements in recall.
Dormant accounts are not the only reason for false negatives.
Some other possibilities are impersonators who copy a vendor’s
PGP key, meaning that the heuristic labels used for evaluation (and
training) are incorrect. On the other hand, pairs incorrectly labeled
as non-matches (i.e., same sellers posting different keys) could also
affect classifier performance, in the sense that the entire range of
behaviors associated with a pair of accounts belonging to the same
seller are not captured by the model. We will investigate this further
in the case studies described below.
Turning to false positives, through manual examination, we see
that many of these accounts actually belong to the same seller,
although they posted different PGP keys. These sellers might have
used different marketplaces in non-overlapping time periods, even
years apart, and their PGP keys might have expired or they might
have lost their private keys. More can be done in terms of quanti-
fying precisely the extent of this problem, and this is elaborated
upon in Section 7.
As a secondary evaluation, Figure 3 shows the same precision-
recall plot with respect to Labeled set 3. As described in Section 5,
Labeled set 3 is the union of PGP labels in Labeled set 1, and Grams
labels (Definition 4.3), including transitive closures. This set of
labels involves pairs from 18,023 accounts, compared to the earlier
12,121, and involves additional PGP matches (from later in the data
collection period), as well as labels generated in a different way
from what was used to train the model (using additional Grams
data as well as transitive closures). This results in a pessimistic
estimate of the generalization error of the classifier. Figure 3 shows
that precision is not much poorer, but recall does suffer. The false
negatives issue that was described earlier is exacerbated by the
additional links reported by Grams.
6.2 Clustering accuracy
Next, we re-evaluate performance after the clustering step, using
the four types of linkages as described in Section 5. We use the
classifier trained on PGP labels as described in Section 5, sampling
10 million non-matches (since from Figure 2(a) this produces the
best performance). Predictions are generated on all pairs, includ-
ing unlabeled pairs, and we then run hierarchical clustering using
dissimilarity cutoffs at regularly spaced intervals from 0 to 1. We
compute the precision and recall at each, evaluated using pairs
with non-missing labels. The results are in Figure 4. Minimax and
average linkage have superior performance, but minimax linkage
has the further advantage of interpretability (see Section 5). For
this curve, the bend occurs at around a cutoff of 0.74, optimizing
the trade-off between precision and recall. Both of these are around
0.8 with this cutoff.
The final choice of cutoff and/or linkage method depends on the
type of performance desired. For example, if an individual might be
implicated in a crime, false positives could be extremely undesirable,
in which case we want a very high level of precision. If we are
interested in generating investigative leads for a particular account,
and will be reviewing matches manually, we might instead prefer
high recall. In this case, transitive closures may not be a concern
either, and we might simply select pairs for which the classifier
produces higher predictions, for manual review.
As a final step, we use the results from the clustering step above,
using minimax linkage with a cutoff of 0.74. These modeling choices
result in assigning the 22,163 accounts to 15,652 distinct sellers.
12,155 of the sellers are singletons, and the remainder operate mul-
tiple accounts. For instance 1,909 sellers operate 2 accounts; at the
opposite end of the spectrum, 2 users operate 11 accounts. More
interestingly, hundreds of sellers operate four or more accounts,
which validates the motivation for this work.
6.3 Case studies
We next look at a series of case studies, combining publicly available
criminal complaints with online discussions on accounts of interest.
6.3.1 Court records. As noted earlier, ground truth regarding on-
line anonymous markets is elusive. However, when an individual
is arrested for allegedly selling goods on an online anonymous
marketplace, the court usually lists (some of) the various aliases
under which they operated. To assess how well our algorithm could
independently infer documented matches, we manually looked at
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Figure 2: Precision vs. recall varying the number of non-matches sampled, using 50 trees. The left hand plot shows results for all
accounts; the middle plot only considers the top 30% of accounts in sales volume (i.e., those who have sold more than $11,617.81 worth of
































































(c) All seller accounts (weighted by volume).



































criminal complaints, indictments, and sentencing statements culled
from multiple sources (press articles, DoJ releases, etc.) correspond-
ing to 195 distinct individuals. These documents report on 130
different screen names—some of which may have been used on
multiple marketplaces—grouped in 103 families. There is no fixed
reporting rule in these documents, and different accounts usually
need to be significantly different to be mentioned separately; mere
case changes are unlikely to be mentioned. As a result, infering
account clusters using these documents is not straightforward.
With these caveats in mind, we infer that in 12 cases, a given
individual is allegedly using more than one account, and in four of
those, the complaint matches more than two different accounts to
the same person. Out of these 12 cases, five cases mention accounts
that do not appear in our database—perhaps because that account
did not receive any feedback, or due to incompleteness of our data.
For the remaining seven cases, we observe that, depending on the
parameter specifications used, some of these are matched.
With the very conservative cut-off of 0.74 we used earlier (de-
signed to minimize false positives), and using minimax linkage,
we do not find any of these seven matches; reducing the cutoff
slightly to 0.5 and still using minimax linkage, we find the right
match for one of these cases. As described in Section 6, when an
automated algorithm is used to generate leads for manual review,
as expected to be the case in a criminal investigation, we might
choose parameter specifications designed to produce high recall
instead. Further, resolving transitive closures is less important. We
hence look directly at the pairwise results from the random forest
classifier, sampling 10 million non-matches (this corresponds to
the red curve in Figure 2(a)). Models sampling a smaller number of
non-matches produce predictions that are even less conservative,
but we do not discuss that in detail here. Examining these pairs for
the remaining six cases, we find that in half of them, at least one
alternate account is matched with prediction 0.2 or higher.4 In the
remaining three cases, sellers did such an excellent job compart-
mentalizing their businesses over multiple accounts, for example
selling different categories of products on different accounts, that
the algorithm was unable to find matches in those cases.
6.3.2 Adversarial examples. As described, we have designed a sys-
tem to detect some subset of adversaries. We look at two scenarios
of interest in more detail, and examine where the algorithm suc-
ceeds and fails: (1) accounts belonging to the same vendor, but
having different screen names and PGP keys; and (2) impersonators
copying a screen name and/or PGP key.
In the first scenario, we found a large number of accounts with
different screen names and PGP keys that cluster, even using a
conservative cutoff of 0.74 and minimax linkage. At a pairwise
level, this resulted in 12,320 pairs being predicted to be matches. Of
these, 2,910 had common PGP keys, 757 did not have common keys,
and the remaining 8,653 pairs had a missing label, meaning that
one or both accounts in the pair did not post a key. The distribution
of edit distances of IDs for these predicted matches is in Figure
5. Over 30% of pairs had different IDs. Broken down by labeled
match status (using training labels), pairs posting different PGP
keys tend to have larger differences in screen names, more strongly
suggesting adversarial intent.
Additionally, we verified some of these predicted matches manu-
ally; some do not attempt to conceal their identity, providing this in-
formation in their profile descriptions, while others do not explicitly
do so. We attempted to confirm such cases using online discussion
forums such as Reddit. Some examples are FTB on Black Market
Reloaded being matched to fredthebaker on other marketplaces,
kaypee911 on BlackMarket Reloaded beingmatched to aaapee911,
evopee911, etc. on othermarketplaces, and Sheld0nC00per on Pan-
dora being matched to KeithLemon elsewhere. All these matches
despite not having a common PGP key in the training data.
4While this might seem like a low threshold, it represents less than 0.01% of all pairs.
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Figure 5: Edit distance of IDs for model predicted matches.

















As for impersonators, we found several examples of accounts
with the same screen name or the PGP key of a different user,
that our algorithm successfully placed in different clusters. For
instance, LowLands on Silk Road 2 tried to impersonate LowLands
on other marketplaces, which was confirmed in the account profile.
(“ATTENTION !!! ON SILK ROAD 2 THERE IS A SELLER LOWLANDS
CLAIMING TO BE US....THIS IS NOT TRUE!!!..BE AWARE !!!!!!”).
Similarly gotmilkreplica copied gotmilk’s PGP key, and posted
on forums claiming to be gotmilk.5 The former ships knockoffs
from Hong Kong, while the latter is a large seller shipping prescrip-
tion medication from India, and it seems unlikely that they are in
fact the same seller.
6.3.3 Model and label disagreements. Finally, we examine some ex-
amples where the model and label strongly disagree. To be specific,
we notice that in Figure 3, there is a kink in the bottom right where
even using the smallest cutoff for matches, the model is unable to
correctly predict all matches. We discussed this in Section 6.1, not-
ing that the problem is worse when evaluating pairs using Labeled
Set 3, where the model is unable to predict some close to 10% of
labeled matches. Restricting to pairs where both accounts are in
the top 30% of sales volumes (as in Figure 2), there are 117 pairs
which are labeled matches (according to Labeled Set 3), but have
model predictions of zero.
Looking at these pairs manually, we found that 26 pairs (22% of
the 117 pairs) involve a cluster of accounts on the Dream market-
place (cannab1z, GlazzyEyez, ibulk, MarcoPolo420, MissJessica
and mushroomgirl), and some of MissJessica’s accounts on other
marketplaces. Further investigation revealed that during the seizure
of Hansa and AlphaBay marketplaces in 2017, the Dutch National
Police gained control of at least a dozen accounts on Dream, and
posted their PGP key on all of the account pages.6 Many of the
accounts in this cluster were victims of this takeover. This case
study highlights the problems with solely using PGP keys or Grams
labels for matching, and suggests that the error rates reported when
evaluating our model against these labels are an overestimate.
7 DISCUSSION
Classifier performance. Looking at variable (or feature) impor-
tances from the random forest classifier, we can better identify




Variable Mean Gini decrease
Edit distance between IDs 3690
Jaccard similarity between item title tokens 1109
Jaccard similarity between item description tokens 697
Jaccard similarity between profile tokens 206
Same or different marketplace 160
Difference between number of item title tokens 109
Difference between number of item description tokens 93
Difference between fraction of daily sales 89
Difference between mean item price sold 88
Hamming distance between sales dates 88
Table 2: Variable importance in random forest classifier. Top
10 pairwise comparison features and their associated importance
measured using mean decrease in Gini impurity.
a successful attack. Using the classifier sampling 10 million non-
matches, we present variable importances in Table 2, measured
using mean decrease in Gini impurity.7 The items sold through
each account, and their associated information plays a large role in
determining if a pair of accounts is a match or not. The implication
is that for an impersonation attack to succeed, an impersonator
would have to sell products with item titles and descriptions very
similar to those in the account that they are impersonating. This is
hard to forge, as sales actually need to be confirmed by feedback
for our classifier to consider the associated accounts.
Limitations. As described, the labels used to train the model
are heuristics rather than ground truth labels. There are many
inaccuracies due to the same vendor usingmultiple keys, or different
users using the same key. In Section 6.3.3 we discussed an incident
where the Dutch National Police posted the same key on multiple
accounts. We have attempted to generate labels in alternative ways,
and future work would involve training the model on these and
comparing the results. As discussed in Section 4, generating labels
from profile information using regular expressionmatching was not
particularly successful, but this could be improved either by manual
extraction or using more sophisticated tools to extract semantic
from profile descriptions.
Related to this, it is difficult to determine the proportion of false
positives that are actually true positives, or false negatives that are
actually true negatives. As a reviewer suggested, one option would
be to randomly sample cases bucketed by model score for manual
review. We did this to some extent in Section 6.3.3, noting that out
of 117 selected false negative pairs, at least 22% are true negatives,
but a more comprehensive analysis could be done.
The algorithm itself is susceptible to adversaries that take great
lengths to mimic behavior, as illustrated by several examples dis-
cussed earlier. The current methodology also assumes that account
ownership does not change over time, which we know anecdotally
to be false, for example due to sales of accounts or police takeovers.
Finally, scalability is a notable limitation, since our current im-
plementation is O(n2). Generating some of the pairwise features
is extremely slow and memory-intensive. Likewise, training the
model is very memory-intensive. It was prohibitively expensive to
sample more than 10 million non-matches.
7The Gini impurity decreases after each split. For a single tree, summing these when-
ever a particular feature is used in the split gives the decrease in Gini impurity for that
feature. Taking the mean over all trees gives the mean decrease in Gini impurity, and
provides a measure of feature importance.
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8 CONCLUSION
Building on an eight-year data collection effort, we implemented
various methods (classification and clustering) to infer relationships
between disparate vendor accounts on dark net marketplaces. We
have shown that it is possible to develop a classifier to match these
accounts in an adversarial context, where sellers may not want
their accounts to be linked, or may attempt to impersonate others.
In aggregate, our classifier performs reasonably well (precision
and recall both above 75%) both on unseen test data, as well as data
labeled differently from how the model was trained. The classifier
performs particularly well (recall close to 90%) for accounts with
significant (> $11,000) sales volumes. Because ground truth is not
generally available, actual performance may even be higher. Anec-
dotal evidence from manually investigating false positives and false
negatives suggests mislabeled entries exist in the test set.
Additionally, we could confirm examples of correct matches and
non-matches in situations where partial ground truth was available
(e.g., publicly available criminal complaints). There remains room
for improvement, particularly in terms of scalability and inferring
more accurate labels for both training and testing.
Matching seller accounts on anonymous marketplaces gives re-
searchers a better understanding of the ecosystem, by providing
more accurate figures on the number of unique sellers involved:
while the vast majority of sellers only operate one account, some
sellers may be behind as many as 11 accounts. Finally, we hope
that our work gives insights into solving similar adversarial match-
ing problems in other domains. In particular, studying tradeoffs
between performance and the selection features resilient to adver-
sarial tampering is key.
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A APPENDIX: REPRODUCIBILITY
Our scraped and parsed marketplace data is stored in a set of SQL
databases which total approximately 60 GB. Part of this was used in
previous studies [7, 25] and is currently available through the IM-
PACT portal [9]. The remainder (data from Berlusconi, Traderoute,
Valhalla, and Dream) is available through the project Github. We
provide in this paper a link to the publicly available Grams data, as
well. Except for Grams, these more recent datasets will be shortly
available on IMPACT as well. Note that somebody interesting in
reproducing the whole study from scratch would have to obtain
the non-anonymized versions of the market data, as many features
require for instance full item descriptions.
From these pre-processed source datasets, we use a Python
(Python 3.4.3) script to extract PGP keys from vendor profiles and
item descriptions via a number of hand-tuned heuristics. The script
utilizes SQLite3 bindings for Python3 but no other non-standard li-
braries. The vendor key mappings are then aggregated and merged
with Grams data to produce all of the vendor relations from Sec-
tion 4. This script requires 22 GB of RAM and takes approximately
1 hour to run on an Intel 6700-K processor where the majority
of time is occupied in reading the large input datasets as well as
the single-threaded computation time of parsing PGP keys and
computing the transitive closure of the relations.
Additionally we use a Perl script that interacts with the GPG
command-line utility (GnuPG 2.2.12 / libgcrypt 1.8.4) to build a
keyring from PGP keys that have been extracted. This step allows
us to identify which keys that have been used to sign the public keys
extracted from user profiles and item descriptions. The relationships
between keys extracted from this process are then synthesized as a
SQLite3 database that is then provided to compute the relation from
definition 4.2. This step takes approximately 3 hours to run, requires
very low RAM and is bound by single-threaded CPU performance.
In the last step, the processed data (source databases and data
labels) is ingested by R code where we extract account-level in-
formation as well as train and evaluate the model. Training the
largest model requires about 70GB of memory and the entire pro-
cess takes roughly 30 hours to complete, however this is not a
fundamental limitation of our approach but rather an artifact of
the implementation.
All code and data for this project is available at https://github.
com/xhtai/heisenbrgr/ and includes installation and setup instruc-
tions. This code has been tested against free open-sourced Linux
builds and does not require any proprietary packages.
